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Neighbors’ income distribution: economic
segregation and mixing in US urban neighborhoods
By Anna Hardman
  and Yannis M. Ioannides
Abstract
The paper describes within-neighborhood economic segregation in U.S. metropolitan areas in
1985 and 1993.  It uses the neighborhood clusters of the American Housing Survey,
standardized by metropolitan area income and household size, to explore income distribution
within neighborhoods at a scale much smaller than the census tract (a representative sample of
households or ‘kernels’ and their ten closest neighbors). Joint and conditional distributions
portray neighbors’ characteristics conditional on the kernel’s housing tenure, race and income.
The paper documents both significant income mixing in the majority of US urban micro
neighborhoods and the extent of income mixing within neighborhoods of concentrated
poverty.
JEL classification codes: D31, C14, R21, R38.
Keywords: income distribution, neighborhood effects, neighborhood income distribution,
economic segregation, income sorting and mixing, mixed income housing, housing policy.3
1. Introduction
The distribution of income in residential neighborhoods matters.  Since Alfred Marshall,
economists have known of the role of nonmarket interactions and externalities in cities, and
we know that for firms urban diversity increases the value of those interactions [Quigley
(1998)].  The same is true for households: a rapidly growing literature in economics
documents the importance for households of nonmarket social interactions and externalities in
cities [Glaeser (2000)].  Income homogeneity or diversity is one of many dimensions of
neighborhood social interactions yet unlike racial segregation, economic segregation as a
feature of US neighborhoods attracted little attention from economists until recently.
Nonmarket social interactions occur whenever one household’s characteristics affect its
neighbors’ behaviors or socioeconomic outcomes.  For example, if neighbors provide role
models (positive or negative) or labor market connections then the productivity of investment
in children’s education may be affected by a neighborhood’s income distribution, [Durlauf
(2003)].
The value of neighborhood interactions has attracted policymakers’ attention and led to policy
initiatives intended to take advantage of positive externalities associated with mixing
households of different income levels in neighborhoods
2.  Yet we know surprisingly little
about the degree of economic mixing or segregation within US neighborhoods, certainly
much less than we know about racial segregation.
Using a representative sample of US urban households and their immediate neighbors, the
American Housing Survey’s neighborhood clusters data, this paper provides a portrait of the
distribution of income and other socioeconomic characteristics among the immediate
neighbors of a random sample of US households in 1985 and 1993.  There is no unique
definition of a neighborhood and economic segregation in neighborhoods can be viewed at
many scales [White (1987); Ellen (1999), pp. 13-14].  What we know about income
distribution within US urban neighborhoods has been limited by the data available.  The most
disaggregated data that US studies have used are decennial census data for census tracts (with
an average population of 4,000): mean and median family and household income, per capita
                                                
2  See Cityscape (1997) for discussion of several such policy experiments.4
income and poverty rates.  In household-level micro data sets spatial detail is concealed to
preserve respondents’ privacy. The smallest geographical identification is metropolitan area
for the American Housing Survey and PUMA’s (with a population of 40,000 or more) for the
Census Public Use Microdata.  Because spatial detail was not available in these household
level data sets, it was impossible to use them to analyze income distribution for smaller areas.
Yet many neighborhood interactions take place at the scale of neighbors on the same block or
in the same apartment building, rather than in the neighborhoods of several thousand people
represented by census tracts
3.
This paper presents the results of an empirical study of income mixing in neighborhoods of
U.S. cities using the neighborhood clusters data, a relatively neglected feature of the
American Housing Survey.  We briefly discuss theoretical and policy issues immediately
below.  Section 2 provides a detailed description of the neighborhood clusters data of the
American Housing Survey (AHS) and of the measures of income used here, notably the
HUD-adjusted median family income, (HAMFI).  The third section discusses alternative
measures of income mixing and summarizes our findings on the income distribution of US
neighborhoods.  We find that a substantial degree of income mixing characterizes the great
majority of urban neighborhoods where mix of incomes is the outcome of market forces.  In
particular, in 1993 over two thirds of the micro neighborhoods included at least one household
(out of ten) with an income of 30% of HAMFI (the poorest one sixth of the sample); over half
of all neighborhoods included at least one household with an income of 150 % of HAMFI (the
richest one fifth of the sample
4).  Section 4 reviews our conclusions and briefly discusses
policy implications.
Determinants of neighborhood economic segregation or heterogeneity
For the vast majority of US households, neighbors’ incomes and other characteristics are the
market-driven outcome of individual choices
5.  Households’ tastes for housing space, quality
and access to jobs and amenities, together with their incomes and assets, define demand for
                                                
3 Mayer (2001), using census and PUMS data, estimates the variance of income within census tracts for each
state.  Bradbury (1996) studies regional trends, Mayer (1996) considers intrametropolitan differences in income
inequality and Madden (1996; 2000) emphasizes metropolitan areas.
4 Tables 4 and 5.5
housing types and locations.  Prices set in the housing market determine what housing units
and neighborhoods households can afford.
Two models central to urban economics predict that incomes in market-driven urban
neighborhoods will be quite homogeneous.  Tiebout (1956) implies that households sort
themselves into communities with similar tastes and incomes.  The monocentric city model
predicts that households who differ only in terms of income will occupy successive
(concentric) zones in a monocentric city; their location in space will depend on the income
elasticity of demand for housing and the cost of commuting [Mills (1967), Muth (1969)].  On
the supply side of the housing market, spatial differences in the price of land contribute to the
formation of new neighborhoods of homogeneous units.  These models together suggest that
market forces are a powerful source of spatial bias toward intra-neighborhood homogeneity
[Vandell (1995)].
Introducing more realistic features to the housing market, however, blurs this picture.
Wheaton (1977) cast doubt on the monocentric city model’s predictions of income
segregation when he found empirically that income elasticities of housing demand and
commuting cost were very similar, and therefore bid price functions were almost identical
across income groups.  A second important source of income mixing in neighborhoods is
transaction costs.  Changing housing consumption usually requires moving.  Because the cost
of moving is high  (including both out of pocket costs and loss of location-specific social and
human capital), most households move infrequently.  We expect that some households will be
consuming more or less housing than they would choose if they moved.  Moreover, among
movers consideration of the cost of future moves may lead households to incorporate
expectations in choosing a housing unit, so that they too may consume more or less housing
than they need immediately.  Owner-occupiers may choose to change housing consumption in
place, reducing housing consumption by subdividing and renting out part of a dwelling, or
increasing it by investing in additions and improvements.  Renters can reduce housing
consumption in place by sharing or increase it by expenditures on improvements in rented
dwellings.
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Housing choices and the resulting income distribution in neighborhoods also reflect market
failures, as households interact with and face constraints set (and discrimination) by other
agents in the market such as lenders, landlords and real estate agents.  Policies, some designed
to remedy market imperfections, in turn interact with individual choices in the housing market
to determine the distribution of household incomes in neighborhoods.  Policies that increase
moving costs reduce mobility and hence increase the likely dispersion of neighborhood
incomes
6.  Both tenure discounts given by landlords and rent controls increase diversity in
incomes within rental buildings.  If households care about their neighbors' characteristics
including heterogeneity [Schelling (1978)], then households' location decisions further
interact to generate the distribution of incomes within and across neighborhoods.  Schelling’s
model implies that neighborhood heterogeneity can be expected to persist, provided it stays
below some threshold value.  On the supply side, a deteriorating housing stock that is
gradually (but not uniformly) replaced or rehabilitated (often at higher densities) over time
will add further complexity.
2. The Data
This paper uses the American Housing Survey's neighborhood clusters data to look at income
distribution in ‘micro neighborhoods’
7.  In 1985, 1989 and 1993, one percent of the dwelling
units in the AHS national core urban sample were designated as kernels for neighborhood
clusters.  The nearest neighbors of each kernel were interviewed (approximately ten in 1985;
more in 1989 and 1993).  In our data, a cluster therefore consists of a randomly chosen
member of the national AHS sample of urban dwelling units, the kernel, together with the
dwellings closest to it, its neighbors [Hadden and Leger (1990), p. 1-51].  Regarding the
location of the clusters, the public dataset identifies only the metropolitan area (or state for
nonmetropolitan urban clusters) and type of place (metropolitan central city, metropolitan
suburban or non-metropolitan urban, etc.) of each cluster.  Ioannides (2002) establishes the
representativeness of the sample and provides additional details on the data.
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The clusters data allow us to study spatial income distribution at a much finer grain than is
possible with other data sets.  The kernels are a representative sample of the entire population
of urban dwellings.  The clusters, however, are not a random sample of neighborhoods as we
usually think of them.  The clusters are neighborhoods defined with a very small grain, at the
scale of the building or a block or short street.  An important feature of the micro
neighborhoods defined by our data set is that the households potentially interact with each
other frequently, on stairs, in elevators, on the sidewalk, at the mailbox, bus stop, or in the
street or playground.
Because the cost of living (and particularly of housing) varies from place to place, we
normalize incomes by the median family income for the urban area where the cluster is
located.  We use the HUD adjusted area median family income (HAMFI) for this purpose
8.
This measure is calculated annually by HUD, and based on the median family income for the
metropolitan area.  Because median income reflects earnings in the local job market, it serves
as a proxy, albeit imperfect, for the relative cost of living including housing prices in different
metropolitan areas.  While HAMFI is established using median family income, ours is a
sample of households and not families.  Median household income is significantly lower than
median family income.  Because HAMFI is based on family income, it does not correspond to
the true median for our sample of households.  In 1993, for example, U.S. median household
income was $31241, which corresponds to 75.5 % of $41365, the average value of HAMFI in
our sample for that year [U.S. Bureau of the Census (1985; 1993)].  In the same year, 52 % of
households in our entire sample have income above 80 % of HAMFI, and only 40 % have
incomes greater than HAMFI.  Income in the data includes all sources of earned and unearned
income; it does not include the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing.
We also used the household size weights defined by HUD for use in deriving HAMFI to
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8 The definition and use of the HUD-adjusted area median family income (HAMFI) is described in U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (1996).  HAMFI data are available from HUD [U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (2004)].  The US Census Bureau defines a household as a
person or a group of people who occupy a housing unit. The householder is a person in whose name the housing
unit is owned, being bought, or rented. A family household, or just a family, consists of a householder
 and one or
more people living together in the same household who are related to the householder by birth, marriage or
adoption --- it may also include people unrelated to the household [ US Census Bureau (2001) ].
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calculate normalized income for each household.  In deciding to use the normalized data, we
are assuming that it is neighbors’ standard of living or (roughly) per capita disposable income
that matters. In our data, therefore, a single elderly individual and a family of six with the
same disposable income and in the same metropolitan area will be in different categories of
income relative to HAMFI.
Table 1 summarizes our data: the value of HUD adjusted area median family income
(HAMFI), sample size and income distribution disaggregated into eight categories relative to
HAMFI.  We use these income categories throughout our analysis.  The lower panel of Table
1 shows that each HAMFI category corresponds to between 9 and 16 % of all households (i.e.
in most cases more than a decile of the income distribution)
9 in 1985.  The data are
disaggregated according to three types of place: central city, suburban and urban non-
metropolitan.
3. Evidence and measures of income mixing in the United States
Instead of computing indices of segregation or dissimilarity  [Jargowsky  (1997), Massey and
Denton (1988)], we use the clusters data to describe the distribution of incomes in the micro
neighborhoods surrounding the kernels directly in terms of distributions and conditional
statistics.  When income is measured as a proportion of HAMFI, the majority of U.S. micro
neighborhoods show a considerable (and perhaps surprising) degree of mixing.
We work first with means and coefficients of variation (standard deviation divided by the
mean) of incomes in neighborhood.  They allow us to compare the dispersion of income
within the immediate neighborhoods of kernels with different incomes.  A simple example
helps interpret these statistics.  Consider a population with two types of households: rich and
poor.  Households can be allocated to neighborhoods of equal size in many ways that range
between two extremes.  One is "complete sorting,'' where rich and poor are completely
segregated.  The rich live in rich neighborhoods, and the poor in poor neighborhoods.  The
mean income in rich neighborhoods is the income of the rich and the mean income in poor
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HAMFI categories. It is close though not identical to the distribution for kernels and neighbors in Table 1.9
neighborhoods is the income of the poor.  With complete sorting, the coefficient of variation
of income (CV) within the neighborhood is zero in all neighborhoods.  The second is
“complete mixing,’’ where each neighborhood has the same proportion of rich and poor as the
population.  The CV of income in each neighborhood is nonzero and equal to the CV of
income in the population.  When neighborhoods are characterized by complete mixing, there
is no heterogeneity across neighborhoods: all are identical.
How much variation is there in US neighborhood incomes?  Our results suggest that most of
the heterogeneity of income previously observed at the census tract level is preserved at the
smallest scale of neighborhood.  Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for income for all kernels
(a random sample of the population of households) and for all neighborhoods.  The median
CV for neighborhoods were, respectively for 1985 and 1993, .58 and .60, and the mean CV
.61 and .63.  While this is not complete mixing (the coefficient of variation of income in the
population was .87 and .85, respectively for the two years), it is far from complete segregation
in all but a few neighborhoods.  The upper and lower bounds describe a few very
homogeneous neighborhoods (the lower bound looks close to complete segregation),
considerable dispersion in the majority of neighborhoods (the interquartile range is  .49 to .74
in 1993), and a few very heterogeneous neighborhoods (the maximum CV is 1.80).
The characteristics of neighborhoods differ depending on the kernel’s own characteristics.
How does housing tenure affect the mean income of a kernel's neighborhood?  Table 3 shows
statistics on income and other socioeconomic characteristics of neighbors conditional on
housing tenure and race.  Renter kernels live, not surprisingly, in neighborhoods with lower
mean income than owner kernels ($29,090 compared to $43,903) but where incomes are more
diverse (the CV of income is .92 for renters and .77 for owners).  The coefficients of variation
for other socioeconomic characteristics show renters’ neighborhoods characterized by more
diversity than owners’ with respect to age, education and numbers of children.  Other rows in
Table 3 show the proportion of neighbors with discrete socioeconomic characteristics: renter
kernels have fewer owner neighbors, as well as more neighbors with income below .5 HAMFI10
and fewer neighbors with income above HAMFI.  Neighbors of owner kernels are older, have
more education and fewer children
10.
The second tool we use is measures of the joint distribution and conditional distributions of
kernel incomes and of neighborhood (cluster) incomes.  To describe neighborhood incomes,
we use quantiles of the income distribution of the cluster.  Table 4 reports the frequency
distribution of kernel household income and of neighborhood median income by income
category in 1985 and 1993.  Differences between those two years are small, and the remainder
of the discussion here is restricted to 1985.  Not surprisingly, the distribution of neighborhood
median incomes is more concentrated than that of kernel household incomes.
Table 5 provides additional detail for the 1993 income distribution of all neighborhoods.
Extremes of the income distribution are quite widely represented: the majority of
neighborhoods include at least one household that falls in the lowest category of the income
distribution.  The first data column of Table 5, the distribution of neighborhood minimum
income by income category, shows that 68.5 % of all neighborhoods have at least one
household with income in the lowest HAMFI category (the poorest 17 % of households).
From the last column of table 5 (the distribution of neighborhood maximum income), we see
that 56.6 % of neighborhoods have at least one household with income in one of the two top
HAMFI categories (the richest 20 % of households).
At the same time, the lowest income families are concentrated.  The fourth column (the
income bound of the third quartile) identifies neighborhoods of concentrated poverty: it shows
that in 5.2 % of all neighborhoods, at least three fourths of all neighbors had incomes in the
lowest HAMFI category. Moreover, in 4.5 % of neighborhoods there were no neighbors with
incomes higher than 50 % of HAMFI (summing the first two rows of the last column,
showing the distribution of neighborhood maximum income).
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of statistics needed to express preferences over neighbors’ characteristics in the style of Schelling (1978).11
Figure 1 illustrates the income distribution of all neighborhoods by graphing the data in Table
5.  The three curves show the cumulative distribution of kernels ranked by Q1 (the lower
bound of the interquartile range), by neighborhood median, and by Q3 (the upper bound of the
interquartile range).  The horizontal axis of the graph shows the income category for each
neighborhood income measure.  The vertical axis shows the cumulative distribution of kernels
in neighborhoods in which the Q1 (median, Q3) falls in successive categories.  For example,
about 25% of all kernel households live in neighborhoods in which neighbors’ median income
falls in or below the range .3—.5 HAMFI.
  The income distribution in all neighborhoods cannot reflect accurately the income distribution
experienced by kernel households in different income categories.  Figure 2 therefore shows
the conditional neighborhood median income for kernels in each of the eight income
categories.  Each curve traces the cumulative distribution of median neighborhood income for
kernel households in a given income category.  With complete mixing kernels at every
income level would live in neighborhoods with the same median income, one that would
match that of the entire population.  The curve for every kernel income would then jump from
zero to 100% at the population’s median income.  With complete sorting, on the other hand,
the median income of neighbors would be identical to the kernel’s income, concentrated in
each type of neighborhood. The cumulative distribution for each (segregated) income group
would jump from zero to 100 % at the corresponding income category.  In fact, we see neither
extreme.  Neighbors’ median incomes are dispersed for each kernel income level, but the
distribution of median neighbors’ income rises as the income of kernels rises.  To see this
clearly, consider the kernels with incomes of 1.0—1.2 of HAMFI, (shown by the curve
marked by bars).  Among those kernels, 42% live in neighborhoods with median
neighborhood income at or below .5—.8 of HAMFI.
In Figure 2, the curves for kernels in the three lowest income categories (together representing
the poorest 30 % of the household income distribution) are very similar.  The curve
representing kernels in the highest income group (top 10 % of the household income
distribution) has a strikingly different distribution of neighborhood median income.  This
graph portrays a group of homogeneous middle/high income neighborhoods.  We see in Table12
5 that even in these relatively homogeneous high income neighborhoods there is some
diversity in terms of HAMFI: 8.8 % of all neighborhoods had Q1 of neighborhood income of
100% of HAMFI or more, meaning that fewer than one quarter of neighbors had incomes
below the top 40 % of the income distribution of households).  Only 0.4 % of neighborhoods
had Q1 of neighborhood income in the top income category (in the top 11 % of the income
distribution of households) and no neighborhoods were observed with minimum income in
the top two income categories (20 % of the income distribution of households).
 
  The heterogeneity in high-income neighborhoods partly reflects the definition of income used
which does not include the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing.  Some low
income households in higher income neighborhoods have high permanent incomes, but low
current incomes either because of short term fluctuations in income (unemployment for
example) or because they are living on significant non-human wealth.
 
  Another way to use the conditional distribution is to consider who lives in neighborhoods
with different median income levels.  For Figure 3, we classify neighborhoods by the median
income of the cluster.  Each curve traces the cumulative distribution of kernel income (shown
on the horizontal axis) in the neighborhoods in one median income category.  It shows the
cumulative probability that a neighborhood with a given median income will have a kernel
with a median income in or below each successive income category.  With complete mixing,
the median income in all neighborhoods would be identical and the curve would trace the
distribution of income in the population.  With complete segregation, each curve would rise
vertically at the corresponding income category.  In Figure 3, neighborhood median incomes
are associated with distinct patterns of neighborhood income distribution.
 
  Neighborhoods in the two lowest median income categories look quite similar, and contrast
with the neighborhoods in the two highest income categories which have a quite distinct
pattern.  However, it is important to remember that the curves do not represent equal numbers
of neighborhoods.  Neighborhoods in the two lowest income categories together represent
29% of all neighborhoods (see column 3 of Table 5).  In the very poorest neighborhoods,
those with median income of .3 HAMFI or less, 37% of kernels have income of .3 HAMFI or13
less, and 20.5% of kernels have income of .3—.5 HAMFI; 7% of kernels in these
neighborhoods have income of 1.2 HAMFI  or more.  The income distribution in
neighborhoods with median income of .3 to .5 HAMFI is similar (46% of kernels with income
of .5HAMFI or less and 5% of kernels with income of 1.2 HAMFI or more).
 
  The four neighborhood types in the center of the graph in Figure 3, corresponding to
neighborhood median incomes from .5 to 1.5 HAMFI, represent almost two thirds of all
neighborhoods (Table 5) and are characterized by substantial income mixing, with both tails
of the income distribution represented. In these neighborhoods, 18% to 40% of kernels have
incomes of 1.5 HAMFI or more while 13% to 26% of kernels have incomes of .5 HAMFI or
less.
 
  A minority of high income households live in quite segregated neighborhoods.  From Figure
2, we see that the 7.2% of neighborhoods with median income of 1.5 HAMFI or more house
about 31% of kernels with income above 2.0 HAMFI and 10% of kernels with income of 1.2-
1.5 HAMFI.  Figure 3 shows that in the 4.7% of all neighborhoods with median income of
1.5-2.0 HAMFI, 11 % of kernels have incomes of .5 HAMFI or less while 16% have income
of 1.5-2.0 HAMFI and another 34% have income of 2.0 HAMFI or more.  In the richest and
most segregated 2.5% of neighborhoods, with median income of 2.0 HAMFI or more, 7% of
kernels have incomes of .5 HAMFI or less and 70% of kernels have income of 2.0 HAMFI or
more.
 
  4. Policy implications and conclusions
  The results of our study have both immediate and long run implications for public policy.
The mix of household incomes in US residential neighborhoods, like the mix of races and
ethnicity, is determined by the housing market, planning and other elements of public policy.
The impact of public policy has sometimes been intentional and at other times unforeseen.
Public housing and neighborhoods with large lot zoning come to mind as extreme examples
of planned (intentional) segregation by income.  Planned unit developments encourage
developers to mix structure types, thereby increasing the probability of appealing to a
heterogeneous mix of household types and incomes; inclusive zoning laws in some states14
encourage or require developers to include cheaper or subsidized (“affordable”) units in new
developments. Other policy decisions have a powerful albeit unintended influence on the
degree of income mixing, from the tax treatment of owner occupied housing to zoning and
subdivision regulations which limit the heterogeneity of the housing stock (such as
regulations which limit accessory apartments and home businesses).
 
  This study makes it clear that many low-income households are dispersed; however in
significant numbers of neighborhoods the poor are quite concentrated.  Some of the most
income-segregated neighborhoods are the site of public housing, where residents’ eligibility
depends on their income.  Recent policies have set out to use federal resources to induce
greater mixing of households by income as well as race, in the hope that it will lead to
positive peer interactions among heterogeneous households, increase the human capital of low
income youth and workers through peer effects and information flows
11, and even reverse
“epidemic” forces of urban decay, particularly those attributed to negative peer interactions in
homogeneous low income neighborhoods.  HUD’s Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program is
a policy directly aimed at inducing households to take advantage of beneficial neighborhood
effects.  While mixed-income housing thus seems to offer direct and indirect benefits,
planning and evaluation must be grounded in knowledge of the extent of income diversity or
mixing that arises without deliberate public intervention as a baseline.  This paper and the
earlier work summarized here set out to provide such a baseline.
 
  The availability of micro data for US neighborhoods allows us to begin to explore a topic, the
extent of income mixing in market-driven neighborhoods, which has relevance and
importance for cities throughout the world yet in most such data are not available.  Racial
mixing is important as it interacts with income mixing, and detailed measures of segregation
such as those used by Massey and Denton (1988; 1993) and by Jargowsky (1887) at the
metropolitan scale could be fruitfully applied to the neighborhood level.
 
                                                
 
11  Bratt [(1989), pp. 336-338] discusses the ways in which mixed-income housing may help remove “the stigma
associated with living in a ‘project’.”15
  A next step is to explore further the dynamics of within-neighborhood income distribution.
Schelling (1971) predicts that the dynamics can be rich.  How many of the neighborhood
outliers are households whose low income is transitory?  To what extent are neighborhoods
“mixed” because some residents experience temporary shocks that cause their income to be
unusually high or low?  Or are neighborhood incomes “mixed” because some households
have unusually high (or low) tastes for housing or neighborhood characteristics?  Such
households would choose to live in neighborhoods where they spend much more (or less) of
their income on housing than the neighborhood average.  Are neighborhoods mixed because
moving is costly?  Or have “outliers” chosen to stay because they have and value strong ties
to their neighborhood?  Each potential explanation has different policy implications that
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HUD-adjusted Median Family Income (HAMFI), by Type of Place
Sample: Kernels and Neighbors, American Housing Survey
 Year  1985 1993
 Region All Central City Suburban Urban
Nonmetro




6215 2946 2606 663 9207 4126 4105 976
 Total (%) 100 47 42 11 100 45 45 11







30845 29879 32299 24197 41365 40958 42798 32862
Frequency Distributions of Household Incomes  by Type of Place
 1985 1993
 Region All Central City Suburban Urban
Nonmetro






 0.0 - 0.3 16 21 10 16 17 22 12 14
0.3 - 0.5 12 14 10 13 13 15 12 14
0.5 - 0.8 16 17 16 17 18 18 17 19
0.8 - 1.0 13 11 15 9 12 12 14 9
1.0 - 1.2 981 1 99891 0
1.2 - 1.5 11 10 12 9 10 9 11 11
1.5 - 2.0 1 19 1 31 11 08 1 29
> 2.0 12 10 13 15 11 9 12 14
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100Table 2:
Income Distribution and Dispersion
1985  1993
  Distribution of Kernel Households’ Incomes
                 $ $
Mean                  29755 36712
Standard
Deviation:                 25937 31320
Coefficient
of Variation:                  .87 .85
1985                                                       1993
Distribution of the Coefficient of Variation of Neighborhood Median Income
Mean                .60               .63
Minimum                .07               .08
Q1                 .46              .49
Q2(Median)                 .58              .60
Q3                  .71            .74
Maximum                .19            .18Table 3: Characteristics of Neighbors conditional on  Kernel Household
Housing Tenure and Race, 1993











Mean income $ 36,712 29,090 43,903 39,802 30,809
     CV  of income 0.85 0.92 0.77 0.81 0.96
 Mean age 49.3 46.1 51.8 50.0 47.4
     CV of age 0.36 0.40 0.33 0.35 0.36
Mean years of
education
13.0 12.6 13.3 13.1 12.4
     CV of education 0.26 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.27
Mean number of
children
0.70 0.68 0.65 0.63 0.85
     CV of children 1.56 1.70 1.62 1.67 1.52
White 0.82 0.75 0.87 0.93 0.32
Owner 0.60 0.26 0.83 0.64 0.46
Income below .5 of
HAMFI
0.30 0.43 0.21 0.26 0.44
Income above 1.0 of
HAMFI
0.40 0.28 0.49 0.44 0.29
Number of
observations
812 3201 5084 6516 1380Table 4:
Frequency Distributions of Household Incomes and Median Incomes of
Neighborhoods
1985 1993
Income as Household Neighborhood  Household          Neighborhood
% of Income: % Median income: Income: %        Median Income
HAMFI  of Households  % of Clusters  of Households  % of Clusters
0-30%       16          13 17 13
30-50%       13          12 13 16
50-80%       16          27 18 27
80-100%       13         18 12 16
100-120%         9         10  9 12
120-150%       10        11  10  9
150-200%       11           5 10  5
200% -       12           4 11  2
Total   100       100 100 100Table 5
Frequency Distributions of Neighborhood Income Statistics, 1993: All
Neighborhoods
Neighborhood Neighborhood Neighborhood Neighborhood Neighborhood
Min Income   Q1 Income  Median Income Q3 Income Max. Income:
.00-.30 of HAMFI 68.5 31.5 12.8 5.2 2.4
.30-.50 of HAMFI  19.5 27.4 16.2 6.7 2.1
.50-.80 of HAMFI  8.2 24.0 26.6 18.0 8.3
.80-1.00 of HAMFI  1.7 8.5 15.9 12.1 6.1
1.00-1.20 of HAMFI   1.1 4.4 12.4 14.9 9.6
1.20-1.50 of HAMFI   0.9 2.6 8.8 18.9 14.9
1.50-2.00 of HAMFI   0.0 1.4 4.7 15.1 24.1
>2.00 of HAMFI   0.0 0.4 2.5 9.1 32.5
Total 100 100 100 100 100ACSPgraphs85 and 93.xls Figure 1 JHE 1993  Figure 1 JHE 1993
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0-.3 HAMFI  .3-.5 HAMFI .5-.8 HAMFI .8-1.0 HAMFI 1.0-1.2 HAMFI 1.2-1.5 HAMFI 1.5-2.0 HAMFI > 2.0  HAMFI








































Kernel Income < .3 HAMFI
Kernel Income .3-.5 HAMFI
Kernel Income .5-.8 HAMFI
Kernel Income .8-1.0 HAMFI
Kernel Income 1.0-1.2 HAMFI
Kernel Income 1.2-1.5 HAMFI
Kernel Income 1.5-2.0 HAMFI
Kernel Income > 2.0 HAMFI 
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